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ANNEX D
PSB D-47
July 24, 1953

CIA REPORT TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

January - June 1953

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
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CIA REPORT TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

GENERAL APPRAISAL

25X1C The effectiveness of political-psychological (PP) operations is not easily or promptly susceptible to satisfactory assessment other than in exceptional cases. At any stage in its development, CIA successes are measured by the number and importance of operating assets acquired as well as by accomplishments in terms of achieving U. S. objectives.



In the European satellite area, CIA's major efforts continued to center on the build-up of operating potential. Past experience has

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25X1C demonstrated that covert PW, while serving to foster hope and rally the
anti-regime sentiments of the people, to be fully effective, requires
concrete evidence of Communist weakness and resistance activity, as well
as tangible signs of growing Western strength in the area. In this frame
of reference, Albania, [REDACTED]

25X1C [REDACTED] remains the weakest link in the Soviet chain of
satellites. [REDACTED]

25X1C [REDACTED]

25X1C [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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25X1C

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The outstanding events of PW significance occurring during the period were the death of Stalin and the transition ~~25X1A~~ within the USSR.

The importance of both events was area wide

25X1A

1. STATUS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS

25X1C A. Methods and Techniques Employed in Accomplishing these Tasks:

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agents is the desire to aid in the unification of a free Korea.

Past and present policies of the United States and its Western allies toward the Middle East have resulted in deep-seated resentment on the part of the Arabs towards the U.S. role in the creation of the state of Israel and the Arab refugee problem; in growing antipathy throughout the Arab, Asian, and African world directed against the colonial powers and against what is considered an equivocal policy on the part of the U.S. towards the principle of self-determination; and in fear of being drawn into what is regarded as a power struggle between two great rival blocks. Other problems have arisen from the basic weaknesses of the area itself in terms of its vulnerability to attack or subversions, the political instability of most of its governments, and the economic and social deficiencies which exist throughout the region. Aggravating these weaknesses and contributing to the prevailing unrest are the growth of nationalism and racism, and the decline in the British and French power positions in the area, creating a vacuum which the local authorities are incapable of filling. Suspicion on the part of the governments and peoples of the area towards any kind of foreign activity, a reluctance not only to participate with the West in regional defense planning but even to accept Western material aid or advice, the belief that U.S. interest in the area arises only from a desire to counter Communism compounded with a fear that the area will become a theatre of operations in a Soviet-Western power struggle,

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
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
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6. SUBSTANTIVE ACTIONS CUTTING ACROSS AREA LINES

A. Soviet Peace Campaign: The new Soviet "peace offensive" may be interpreted as a significant move in the master plan designed to negate U. S. psychological warfare capabilities during the time of power transition, secure internal support for the new regime, create dissension and confusion among the Western Allies by concessions designed to appeal to the neutralist sentiment on the European continent, wreak havoc on the EDC front and keep a rearmed Western Germany from being committed on the side of the West. It appears aimed at isolating the United States from its allies if, indeed, the U.S. is not captivated by the Soviet "new look".



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[REDACTED]

The "peace offensive" in Eastern European areas, as the result of amnesties declared in the Soviet Union and the Satellites, isolated acts such as the release of William Oatis, and lifting of ration restrictions in several areas, have developed a strong psychological warfare weapon for the Soviets. Soviet overtures toward the unification of Germany on the basis of withdrawal of troops and free elections represent powerful appeals in support of communist objectives.

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Soviet gestures in the Near East along this line have not been without effect. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

In other parts of the world the effect of the peace campaign was obscure, or as in the case of South Asia, accepted with skepticism as the result of the invasion of Laos.

B. Stalin's Death and Succession: The death of Stalin and transition in the party hierarchy overshadowed all other events during the reporting period.

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Immediate world reaction to Stalin's illness and subsequent demise was one of intense speculation. Considerable disarray became manifest at once

within the Satellites. [REDACTED]

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